Pate - Round 5 - April 10 2003

PATE
Previously, I said that I'm surprised to see how hard it is for Steven to understand the points I've made. Well, I may not be so surprised this time, as I've realized by now that Steven either is not able or not willing to seriously interact with the points that I've presented. But if I'm not surprised, I'm somewhat disappointed. As the debate has progressed, it has become more and more evident that the misrepresentations and straw men that Steven has made, as well as his ignoring my responses, are not the result of his failure to understand my position, but rather they are deliberate debater's tricks.

Before I deal with the points that Steven raised, I want to mention something that may be relevant when evaluating Steven's latest reply. Some days before he posted his reply, he started a thread about this debate at Internet Infidels discussion forum. That thread can be found at http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.p...5&pagenumber=1

I don't know how the readers of this debate will interpret his first post to that thread, but it seems to me that he was asking comments about possible ways to respond. He gave a link to the second page of this debate thread, adding only that "Page 1 can also be read if wished." After that, he just quoted certain things that I said in my previous post. I think it's quite reasonable to interpret this as a request for helpful comments. I don't have anything against this procedure as such. I think it's completely acceptable to request comments and hints. But when I saw that Steven just chose to ignore in his reply some of the very points that he quoted from me at Infidels forum, possibly because he didn't receive the help that he was hoping, it's hard for me to think that he hasn't realized their relevance to the central issues of this debate. If my interpretation is entirely wrong, Steven is free to correct me. But I don't think that it's entirely wrong.


I'll now evaluate Steven's latest response and show why he hasn't presented a successful case and why his claims that I've contradicted myself are false. This will be quite easy task for me, because in many cases, all that's required is repeating a point that I've already made before in this debate and which Steven has ignored.

CARR
Atheists can see that there is pointless suffering in the world, which an all-good God could reduce. Pate claims that we don't know what an all-good God would do. All I can do is repeat the common-sense saying that if it looks like a duck, walks like a duck and quacks like a duck, then it is a duck. Of course, it might be that for some reason way beyond our mortal , limited comprehension, God has decided to disguise some chickens as ducks, for reasons which we can never understand, but the burden of proof is not on the people who call a duck a duck.

PATE
As I've repeated through this debate, the fact that God is omniscient and we are very far indeed from the status omniscience, is enough to show that our basis to think that God has no sufficient reason to allow some instance of evil, is extremely weak. The fact that we can't find a reason for some suffering is not good evidence against the hypothesis that God has reasons for allowing such suffering. This is so because of the enormous epistemic distance that exists between God and us. Steven has done nothing to show that this kind of epistemic gulf does not exist if omniscient God exists. He has just continued to assert that atheists are able to know whether or not omniscient God could have sufficient reasons for allowing the sufferings. But I'm not going to accept his assertion, and I will argue that no rational person should accept it, if it is not also shown that the epistemic gulf that I've mentioned does not exist if God exists.


CARR
curing childhood cancer is good, as even Pate agrees, so why does God not help doctors to find the cures? Why does God not help doctors research areas which will lead to a quick cure?

PATE
I only need to repeat what I have already said (and what Steven has already quoted at Infidels forum). It's plausible to think that if there was no severe suffering at all, or if there was extremely small amount of such suffering, then less people would experience the moral and spiritual growth that they in fact do experience. This is important, especially because God's purposes, according to the Christian view, are not limited to our mortal existence in this world. Is this speculative? Yes, it is, to some extent. But it's not implausible. So, why would the severe sufferings like childhood cancer be good evidence against God's existence, especially given the epistemic gulf between God and us? Steven has not given acceptable answer.

CARR
Pate claims it is good to cure childhood cancer and claims we do not know why God does not think it good to help doctors cure childhood cancer. There is a huge contradiction in his views.


PATE
I've explained this before (an Steven has quoted this at Infidels forum), but I'll explain it again. The free human efforts to cure childhood cancer can also contribute to the human moral and spiritual growth, and bring people closer to each other. So, there's no implausibility in the idea that a world where there's severe suffering and where humans can significantly reduce that suffering by their free efforts, is optimal for God's purposes.


The Christian basis for thinking that it is good to help a fellow human being (by efforts to cure childhood cancer, and by helping in many other ways) is the fact that this is what the Bible instructs us to do. It is not a fallacy of argumentation for me to appeal to the Bible here, because Steven is supposed to try to show why suffering gives good evidence against God as portrayed in Christian world-view, and it is of course part of Christian worldview, that Bible contains God's revelation to us.


He claims that we have sufficient knowledge of what is the morally right course of behaviour. Then , by his own logic, we know that it is wrong for God to pass by on the other side.
I've mentioned this before before (and Steven has quoted this at Infidels forum), but I'll mention it again. The moral roles between God and humans are different. God has perfect knowledge, including foreknowledge. Therefore, he's in the position where he can make warranted decision of which sufferings he'll allow because of the greater goods. We lack this kind of knowledge and therefore it is best for us to follow God's instructions, which tell us to reduce the sufferings in the world. This can plausibly be thought to be part of God's optimal plan for humanity, which produces best results available without compromising our freedom too much. But because of the different moral roles that I've just explained, we don't have basis to judge that it's wrong for God to allow sufferings.

CARR
he claims that we really do have knowledge and he has clearly stated that this epistemic gulf has been reliably crossed. How can he state that there is a vast epistemic gulf and then claim that this epistemic gulf has been reliably crossed? He has destroyed his own case.

PATE
No, I haven't destroyed my case. Steven has just destroyed one more straw man that he has himself built, that's all. From the fact that God is able to reliably cross the epistemic gulf and give us revelation, which can be our basis for knowing how we can advance God's plan, it doesn't follow that we can know those parts of God's plan that haven't been revealed to us.

CARR
Pate claims that we do not know what level of suffering is 'optimal' and he also claims to know that the suffering in the Holocaust was not optimal and should have been stopped by us.

PATE
We can know that holocaust was wrong, because it was against what God has revealed to us about the morally right course of behaviour for us. But because Holocaust was caused by free human actions, God could only have stopped it by severely limiting our freedom, which would not be a good thing. So, once again, there's no implausibility in the idea that actualizing this world where Holocaust happened, was optimal for God in the sense that in this world, the total amount of suffering is as good as can be achieved without God's limiting severely our freedom, but not optimal in the sense that if large enough number of humans would have freely chosen the morally right course of behaviour often enough, then preventing Holocaust without compromising human freedom could have been possible. The failure in a situation like this, is on the part of humans, not on the part of God. Is this scenario speculative? Yes, it is. But is it implausible? I don't think so. And Steven has not given good reason to think so.

CARR
He claims we have no rational grounds to say that any world , even a world with a hyper-Holocaust , contains unnecessary suffering. So where are his rational grounds to say that the suffering in the Holocaust was not necessary? Why does he feel the Holocaust should have been stopped when he claims that the suffering was necessary, and he claims it is irrational to say the suffering was not necessary?

PATE
Like I explained above, the suffering was necessary because it could not be prevented by God without compromising human freedom, if it was the case that large enough number of humans through history did not choose to be moral enough and make the world such a place where horrible things like the Holocaust do not happen.

CARR
Pate said it was morally right for God to sacrifice some of us without even our knowledge, let alone consent, but, inconsistent as ever, said that the ultimate responsibility was ours

PATE
If many of the sufferings are caused by our free decisions, and those sufferings that are not caused by our free decisions, are needed to optimize the human moral and spiritual growth to the extent that it can be optimized without compromising our freedom, then it is indeed the case that the ultimate responsibility is ours, because even the sufferings that belong to the latter category, are needed because humans would not freely choose the courses of action that lead to such moral and spiritual growth in absence of those sufferings, but they do freely choose so in the presence of such sufferings.

CARR
Perhaps Pate can tell us how a child can grow into a moral and spiritual human being , when she dies of cancer at the age of three? The difference is that pawns in chess are made of wood and feel nothing, while the children who get cancer , feel and suffer. Perhaps Pate can tell us how a child can grow into a moral and spiritual human being , when she dies of cancer at the age of three? How much moral and spiritual growth had Pate done by the age of three? If Pate wants children to be morally responsible beings, then why does God allow some of them to die with cancer before reaching the age of moral responsibility?

PATE
Steven knows perfectly well that I did not mean that the moral and spiritual growth in these cases must happen to the child herself. I was talking about the total amount of moral and spiritual growth in the world. Of course, it seems very sad that some children die at such a young age, but God is more than capable of adequately compensating this to them after their death.


In conclusion, Steven has failed to show that we are in a position where we can competently evaluate, whether or not God has sufficient reasons for any instance of evil for which we can't find any reason. Steven has also failed to show, that we actually can't find possible and plausible reasons for suffering. It seems clear that the problem of suffering doesn't give good grounds to deny God's existence.